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a( distinct( segment( of( consumers( who( attach( high( value( to( customizability;( it( also(
diverts( demand( from( the( rival( firm.( Firms( use( second( degree( price( discrimination,(
attaching(a(different(price(to(the(different(products.(We(find(the(conditions(leading(to(
both( firms( introducing( the( self<customizable(product,( both( refraining( from( it,( and( to(
asymmetric( equilibria.( Our( results( indicate( that( self<customization( appears( in(
equilibrium;(it(is(profit(improving;(it(can(be(used(by(only(one(or(both(firms(according(
to(the(value(of(the(market(for(customizability.(It(also(leads(to(lower(prices.(An(increase(
















Product( customization( is( an( increasingly( important( phenomenon( and( one(
that(has(generated(a(consistent(body(of(literature((see(Fogliatto(et(al.,(2012,((and(
the( references( therein).( Customization( can( be( of( two( types:( producer<based(
customization( and( consumer<based( customization.( In( the( first( case( the(
producing(firm(develops(a(line(of(products(tailored(to(meet(the(specific(needs(of(
the( end<users( and( bears( the( full( cost( of( customization.( In( the( second( type( of(
customization( it( is( the( end<user( who( bears( the( cost( of( changing( the( product(
characteristics,(but( the(firm(must(be(able(to(provide(the(essential(components,(
the( “ingredients”( to( be( added/changed.( In( between( these( two( extremes(
customization( involves( both( producer( and( customer( at( different( degrees;( for(
instance(the(good(is(co<designed(by(producer(and(customer.((
The( implications( of( producer<based( customization( have( been( deeply(
investigated(in(the(literature.(For(example,(Dewan(et(al.((2003)(develop(a(model(
of(product(customization(by(a(monopolistic(firm,(and(show(that(the(monopolist(




customize(only(some(attributes,(and( they( find( that( in(equilibrium(only(partial(
customization( emerges.( Ghose( and( Huang( (2009)( consider( quality(
customization(by(firms,(and(they(show(that(all( firms(might(get(higher(profits.(













to( consumer<based( customization( (or( self<customization)( rather( than(product<
based( customization:( differently( from( product<based( customization,( self<
customization(typically(does(not(imply(personalized(pricing.(
Consumer<based(customization(has(received(dramatically(less(attention(than(
producer<based( customization( in( the( theoretical( literature.( However,( self<
customization(is(gaining(momentum(in(several(industries((Business(Week,(Dec.(
2002,( Wall( Street( Journal,( Oct.( 2004).( In( particular,( consumer<based(
customization( appears( to( be( increasingly( relevant( in( those( industries( where(
consumers( are( perceived( as( co<creators:( one( such( example( is( the( video<game(
industry( (Ondrejka,( 2004).( In(E<retailing( it( is( also(possible( to(design( the(web<
sites(so(as(to(allow(the(single(consumer(to(arrange(the(“shop(atmosphere”(and(
the( searching( tools(by( combining(different(predetermined( features,( leading( to(
customization(of(the(design(of(the(shop((Vrechopoulos,(2010).(Other(examples(
can(be(find(in(the(textile(industry((Duarte(et(al.,(2017),(or(in(the(logistic(services(
(Mammitzsch( and(Franczyk,( 2016).(As(mentioned(by(Valenzuela( et( al.( (2009),(
the(Dell( Computers(website( is( an( example( of( consumer<based( customization.(
Indeed,( the(consumers(choose(the(preferred( level( for(each( individual(attribute(
that(constitute(the(computer((i.e.,(the(memory,(the(hard(drive(size…),(and(then(
the(computer(is(assembled.(Nike(has(patented(a(system(that(allows(consumers(
to( co<design( products( through( computer( devices( (Franke( and( Schreier,( 2010).(
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Self<customizable( products( are( also( being( introduced( in( the( medical( devices(




At( the( best( of( our( knowledge,( the( only( paper( addressing( the( theoretical(
implications( of( consumer<based( customization( is(Gu(and(Tayi( (2015).(Gu(and(
Tayi( (2015)( analyze( a( monopolist( firm( producing( an( indivisible( good( and(
choosing( whether( to( offer( only( a( standardized( product,( only( a( customizable(
product,( or( both( at( the( same( time.( In( their( model,( the( standardized( product(
provides(the(same(utility(level(to(all(consumers;(the(profit(maximizing(price(is(
then( equal( to( the( reservation( price( of( the( consumers.( By( contrast,( consumers(
have(different( reservation(prices( for( the(customizable(product,(varying(over(a(
finite( interval(with(a(positive( lower(bound.(The(profit(maximizing(price( if( the(
customizable( product( is( sold( in( isolation( is( shown( to( increase( with( the(
customizing( ability( of( the( consumers( and( to( decrease( with( their( cost( of(
customization.(These( two(parameters( therefore(account( for( the(profitability(of(
producing( only( one( or( the( other( product.( Finally,( Gu( and( Tayi( (2015)( also(
provide( the( conditions( under( which( the( monopolist( prefers( to( market( both(
products( rather( than( only( one:( it( is( shown( that( selling( both( products( is(
profitable(when(the(customization(cost(and/or(the(customization(efficiency(are(
not(too(high.((
Differently( from( Gu( and( Tayi( (2015),( we( consider( consumer<based(
customization( in( an( oligopolistic( framework.( In( particular,( we( analyze( a(
Hotelling(linear(city(model(where(at(each(point(there(is(a(proportion(of(ordinary(
consumers(and(a(proportion(of(special((“picky”)(consumers(whose(ideal(point(
                                                
1 “Third Wave DIY draws upon the read/write functionality of the Internet, and digitally-driven 
design/manufacture, to enable ordinary people to invent, design, make, and/or sell goods that they think 




space.( While( ordinary( consumers( could( buy( either( the( standard( (non<
customizable)(product(or(the(customizable(product,(“picky”(consumers(do(not(
buy( the( standard(product,( since( they( find( it( too(distant( from( their( ideal( type,(
but( would( consider( the( purchase( of( a( customizable( product,( because( self<
customization,(while(implying(a(sunk(cost,(allows(to(reduce(the(“distance<cost”(
of( the(purchased(product( from( the( consumer( ideal( specification.(The(distance(





(from( type<2( consumers);( it( diverts( demand( from( the( rival,( an( effect( that( is(
absent(under(monopoly.(
(Our(results(confirm(that(the(incentives(to(introduce(a(customizable(version(




to( self<customize( the( product( is( not( too( high.( Indeed,( greater( ability( in( self<
customization( reduces( the( perceived( product( differentiation,( thus( being(
detrimental( for( profits.( The( private( cost( of( customization( does( not( affect( the(
consumer(choice(between(one(or(the(other(firm(customizable(products(–(when(
both(firms(are(offering(it( <( (and(hence(does(not(affect( their(equilibrium(prices;(











does( not.( When( the( value( of( customizability( is( high( enough( both( firms(
introduce(customizability.(These( results(are(valid(both(when( the( firms(choose(
simultaneously(the(customization(policy(and(when(they(choose(it(sequentially.(
Furthermore,( the( effect( of( introducing( a( customizable( good( on( the(
equilibrium(price(of(the(standard(product(is(shown(to(be(more(complex(in(the(
duopoly( case( than( in( the( monopoly( case( analyzed( by( Gu( and( Tayi( (2015).(
Indeed,(in(the(equilibrium(where(both(firms(offer(both(the(customizable(and(the(
non<customizable( good,( the( price( of( the( standard( product( is( higher( than( the(
price( of( the( customizable( good,( but( lower( than( in( the( case( where( no(
customizability( is( possible.( Hence( all( consumers( gain( from( customizability.(
Also(in(the(asymmetric(equilibrium,(we(find(that(the(price(of(the(standard(good(
is(higher(than(the(price(of(the(customizable(good.((
The( rest( of( the( paper( proceeds( as( follows.( In( Section( 2,( we( introduce( the(
model.( In( Section( 3,( we( discuss( the( symmetric( cases( where( both( firms( offer(
customizability( or( no( firm(offers( customizability.( In( Section( 4,(we(discuss( the(
asymmetric(case(where(only(one(firm(offers(a(customizable(product.(In(Section(








Suppose( there(are( two( firms,(Firm(A( and(Firm(B,( that( sell( to( two( types(of(
consumers,(type<1(and(type<2.(Both(consumers’(types(are(uniformly(distributed(
along( a( linear( product( characteristic( space( of( length( one.(We( assume( density(
one( and(we(denote( by( ]1 ,0[∈x ( the( location( of( each( consumer( in( the( product(







a(cost(c,( invariant(across( types.(The(two(types(differ( in( their(perception(of( the(
firms’(locations.(In(particular,(type<1(consumers(consider(Firm(A(and(Firm(B(to(
be( located(at(0(and(1(respectively,(whereas(type<2(consumers(consider(Firm(A(
and(Firm(B( to(be( located(at( l− ( and( 1+l ( respectively,(where( 0>l .(That( is,( at(
each( location(x,! type<1( consumers(perceive( each( firm’s(product(being( close( to(
their( needs,( whereas( type<2( consumers( (“picky”( consumers)( perceive( each(
firm’s(product(being(far(from(their(needs.(Alternatively(one(may(think(that(“fit(
uncertainty”(for(type<2(consumers(implies(that(the(expected(value(of(the(good(is(
                                                








a(non<customizable(or(standard(product:(it(is( txpv A −− (if(he(buys(from(Firm(A,(
and( )1( xtpv B −−− (if(he(buys(from(Firm(B,(where( Ap (and( Bp (indicate(the(price(
for(the(standard(good(and( 0>t (is(the(unit(“transportation(cost”.(Next(consider(
the(utility(function(of(a(type<1(consumer(when(he(buys(a(customizable(product.(
It(is( cxtpv A −−−− )(ˆ ε (if(he(buys(from(Firm(A,(and( cxtpv B −−−−− )1)((ˆ ε (if(he(
buys( from(Firm(B,(where( Apˆ ( and( Bpˆ ( indicate( the( price( for( the( customizable(
good,( ),0( t∈ε (measures(the(effectiveness(of(customization((indeed,(when( ε (is(
high,( customization( dramatically( reduces( the( disutility( costs( of( consumers,(
while(the(opposite(is(true(when( ε (is(low),(and(c(is(the(fixed(cost(sustained(by(a(
consumer( that( customizes( the( good.3( It( should( be( noted( that( Jp ( and( Jpˆ ,(
BAJ ,= ,( constitute( a( second<degree( discriminatory( pricing( scheme:( indeed,(
differently( from( producer<based( customization( which( allows( personalized(
pricing,( self<customization( implies( that(within( a(menu( of( price<product( pairs(
each( consumer( chooses( the( preferred( one.(We( assume( that( c( is( not( too( high,(
namely( ε≤c ,( and(we( assume( that(v( is( sufficiently( high( so( that( the(market( is(
covered(in(any(situation.(In(particular,(we(assume(that( εεε )2)(2( ctvv −−≡≥ .(
Now,(we(consider(type<2(consumers.(We(assume(that(l!is(so(high(that(a(type<
2(consumer(buys(the(good(only(if(he(can(customize(it.(This(amounts(to(say(that(
type<2( consumers(perceive( the( good(of( both( firms( to( be( so(distant( from( their(
needs( that( they( prefer( not( buying( the( good( unless( they( can( customize( it.4(
                                                
3 As in Gu and Tayi (2015), we assume that the customization cost is known ex ante by all consumers. 
4 For this reason, type-2 consumers can be interpreted as “picky” consumers.  
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Therefore,( the(utility( function(of( a( type<2( consumer( located(at(x( is( as( follows:
clxtpv A −+−−− ))((ˆ ε ( if(he(buys( from(Firm(A,(and( cxltpv B −−+−−− )1)((ˆ ε ( if(
he(buys(from(Firm(B.5,6(











With( regard( to( type<1( consumers,( we( assume( the( following( market(
structure,(moving(from(the( left( to( the(right(of( the(segment:(consumers(buying(
the( standard(good(A,( consumers(buying( the(customizable(good(A,( consumers(
                                                
5 Note that assuming that all type-2 consumers never buy the non-customizable good amounts to assume 
tvl > . As it will be clear later, l plays no role in the analysis, and it is just needed to motivate that type-2 
consumers never buys a non-customizable good. Alternatively, one might consider the following 
expected utility of a type-2 consumer which is uncertain about the fit of the product to his needs before 
purchase when he buys the non-customizable product of, say, Firm A: 
))(1()( γµµ −−−+−− AA pvtxpv , where µ  is the probability that the good fits, even if not perfectly, 
the needs of the consumer, and γ  is the loss when there is no match of the product with the needs of 
consumer x (for example, the consumer must go to the market searching other products). Clearly, if µ  is 
low enough and/or γ  is high enough, all type-2 consumers buy only the customizable product. This 
interpretation yields identical results to the modeling approach used in the text.  
6 In principle, it is possible to imagine the existence of a third group of consumers, constituted by those 
consumers that are not able to customize the product, so that they are forced to purchase the standard 
product. However, since these consumers are only interested in the standard product, the incentives 
driving the introduction of the customizable product would not be qualitatively affected. Indeed, the 
substitutability between the two products for type 1 (the ordinary people) is what determines the pressure 
on the standard product price when a customizable product is introduced, and this would not change much 
if the third type of consumers is added. Therefore, in order not to complicate the analysis, we do not 




The(market(structure( is( illustrated(in(Figure(2,(where(the( label(A( (B)( indicates(
that( the( consumer( is( buying( from( Firm( A( (B),( while( the( price( paid( by( the(
consumers( is( indicated( in( the(brackets.(This(market( structure( reflects( the( idea(
that(consumers(for(whom(the(product(offered(by(the(firm(is(close(to(their(ideal(
point(do(not(need(to(customize(the(good.(By(contrast,((those(consumers(who(are(
distant( from( the( perceived( location( of( the( firm( in( the( product( characteristic(
space(are( the(most( interested( in(customizability,( since( it( reduces( the(distance<
related( disutility( costs.( Indeed,( customization( by( the( consumer( entails( a( cost(
equal(to(c(for(any(consumer,(whereas(it(allows(reducing(the(transportation(costs(
by( an( amount( equal( to( xε ( for( a( consumer( buying( from( Firm(A( and( equal( to(
)1( x−ε ( for( a( consumer(buying( from(Firm(B.( Therefore,( customization( is(more(
beneficial(for(a(consumer(which(is(located(far(from(the(firm.((
On( the( other( hand,( type<2( consumers,( by( assumption,( only( buy( the(






                                                




The( threshold( consumers( are( obtained( by( equating( the( appropriate( utility(















not( depend( on( the( type.( Indeed,( both( cxtpA +−+ )(ˆ ε cxtpB +−−+= )1)((ˆ ε (













If( the( inequalities( 01 ≥≥≥≥ AB xkx ( hold,( the( demand( of( Firm( A( for( the(
customizable(product( is(equal( to( )()1(ˆ A
A xkkD −+−≡ αα (and(that( for( the(non<
customizable( product( is( equal( to( A
A xD α≡ .( The( demand( of( Firm( B! for( the(
customizable( product( is( equal( to( )()1)(1(ˆ kxkD B
B −+−−≡ αα !and( that( for( the(
standard( product( is( equal( to( )1( B
B xD −≡α .( Therefore,( the( profits( function( of(




* ctpJCC +−= ε (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((1)(
ε−= tpJCC*ˆ (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((2)(
((
                                                



































9 Note that at the equilibrium prices it is verified that 01 ≥≥≥≥ AB xkx . 
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Note( that( the( price( of( the( customizable( good( is( lower( than( that( of( the(
standard( good.( Indeed,( the( consumers( buying( the( customizable( product( are(
located(close( to( the(centre(of( the( segment.( It( follows( that( if(one( firm(wants( to(
serve( these( consumers( it( has( to( set( a( low(price,( because( these( consumers( are(
rather(far(from(it(and(rather(close(to(the(rival.(Therefore,(competition(for(these(
consumers( is( fierce( and( the( equilibrium( price( is( low.( This( contrasts(with( the(
monopolistic(case(discussed(in(Gu(and(Tayi((2015).(Indeed,(the(monopolist(can(
exploit( the( fact( that( customizability( increases( willingness( to( pay( of( the(
consumers.( In( contrast,( such( increase( cannot( be( exploited( in( duopoly,( as( the(
two(firms(compete(for(the(same(consumers.(
The(equilibrium(market( share(of( consumers(of( type<1(buying( the( standard(
product( (respectively,( the( customizable( one)( from( Firm( A( is( equal( to( ε2c (
(respectively,( εε 2)( c− ).(Since(the(prices(are(symmetric,(the(same(shares(apply(
to( Firm( B.( Hence,( an( increase( in( ε ( decreases( the( equilibrium( sales( of( the(
standard(product(for(both(firms(and(increases(those(of(the(customizable(good,(
due( to( a( stronger( cannibalization( effect( of( customization.( An( increase( in( the(
customizability(cost,(c,(yields(the(opposite.((
In( what( follows,( we( consider( the( impact( of( the( parameters( on( the(
equilibrium(prices.(Consider(parameter( ε .(When( ε (increases,(the(distance<cost(
for(the(customizable(product(decreases.(That(is,(the(two(customizable(goods(are(
less( differentiated.( This( implies( that( when( the( efficiency( of( customization(
increases,( the( equilibrium(price( for( the( customizable( product( decreases;( since(




to( the( customizable( product)( could( be( charged( with( a( higher( price( (see( the(
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conditions(determining( the( threshold(consumers( Ax ( and( Bx ).(However,(given(
face<to<face( competition( between( firms( for( those( consumers( that( buy( the(
customizable(products,(an(increase(of(c(does(not(affect(the(threshold(consumer(
















c,( whereas( they( strictly( decrease( with( ε .( These( results( have( the( following(
explanation.( As( JCCp ( is( higher( than(
J
CCpˆ ,( when( the( number( of( “picky”(
consumers(decreases((i.e.,(α (goes(up),(the(profits(increase.(On(the(other(hand,(
higher( differentiation( allows( higher( prices( and( lower( cannibalization.(
Therefore,(when( ε ( decreases,( the(profits( increase.( Finally,(we(know( from( the(
above(discussion(that(the(price(for(the(standard(good(increases(with(c,(whereas(























Since( customization( is( not( possible,( neither( c( nor( ε ( affect( the( equilibrium(








In( this( section( we( compare( the( situation( where( both( firms( offer( a(
customizable( product( together( with( a( non<customizable( product,( with( the(












Proposition0 1.(When! αα ~ )(≥≤ ,( the! profits! in! the! CC! case! are! higher! (resp.! lower)!
than!the!profits!in!the!NN!case.!
(






                                                





depends( upon( the( other( parameters( of( the( model.( Indeed,( α~ ( is( strictly(
increasing( in( c( and( strictly( decreasing( in( ε .(Hence,( an( increase( in( the( cost( of(
customizability((up(to( ε ,(which(is(the(upper(bound(for(c)(tends(to(enlarge(the(
parameter( set( where( the( profits( in( the( CC! equilibrium( are( higher( than( the(




while( leaving( the(profits(unaffected( in( the(case(NN.!On(the(other(hand,(when(
considering(parameter(ε ,(the(profits(in(the(NN(equilibrium(do(not(depend(on(ε
,( whereas( the( profits( in( the( CC( equilibrium( are( negatively( affected( by( the(
efficiency( of( customization,( as( a( higher( ε ( implies( lower( differentiation.(
Consequently,(when(ε (goes(up,(the(parameter(space(where(the(profits(in(CC(are(






It( is( worth( comparing( our( result( with( Gu( and( Tayi( (2015).( Gu( and( Tayi(
(2015)( find( that,( in( a(monopolistic( framework,( offering( both( the( customizable(
and(the(standard(product(is(profitable(when(the(cost(of(customization(is(not(too(
high,( in(contrast(with(our(result.( Indeed,(a(higher(c( reduces(the(willingness(to(
pay( of( the( consumers,( so( the( consumers( surplus( that( can( be( extracted( by( the(
monopolist( through( the( customizable( product( is( lower.(On( the( other( hand,( a(
17 
 
lower( ability( to( customize( the( product( plays( a( similar( role( both( in( the(
monopolist( and( in( the( duopolistic( framework,( as( a( too( high( customization(
ability( destroys( the( convenience( to( fall( in( the(CC( case( here( and( to( offer( two(
products(in(the(monopoly((Gu(and(Tayi,(2015).((
(
We( conclude( this( section( with( some( considerations( about( the( impact( of(
customizability(on(the(consumer(surplus.(When(considering(type<2(consumers,(
they(are(obviously(better(off(when(customization(is(possible,(otherwise(they(do(
not(purchase.(With( regard( to( type<1( consumers,( it( easy( to( show( that( they( are(
also(benefited(by(the(possibility(of(customization.(Indeed,(all(prices(are(lower(in(
CC( than( in(NN.( Moreover,( type<1( consumers( buy( the( customizable( product(
























the( standard( product( are( closer( to( Firm( A’s( location( than( those( buying( its(
customizable(product.(The( consumer(who( is( indifferent(between(buying( from(



















AA pxhpxp ˆ)1()](ˆ[ ααπ −+−+= ( and( )1( hpBB −=απ ,( respectively.(
Maximizing(the(profits(function(yields(the(following(equilibrium(prices:11((
                                                



































































































decrease( with( ε ( and( α ( following( the( impact( of( these( parameters( on( the(
prices.12(On(the(other(hand,( *,nsBCNπ ( increases(with(c,(whereas( *
,nsA
CNπ ( is(U<shape(
in( c.( Indeed,( as( the(price(of(Firm(B’s(product( increases(with( c,( Firm(B( always(
benefits( by( higher( costs( of( customizability.( At( the( opposite,( the( price( of( the(
customizable( good( of( Firm( A( decreases( with( c,( whereas( the( price( of( the(
standard(good(increases:(when(c( is( low(the(former(effect(dominates,(while(the(
latter(effect(dominate( for(high( levels(of(c.(Consequently,( the(profits(of(Firm(A(
                                                                                                                                          
necessary conditions for (6)-(8) to sustain the non-segmented market structure are discussed later in 
Lemma 1.  
12 When α  increases, the share of type-1 consumers over type type-2 consumers served through the 
customizable product by Firm A increases, thus increasing the incentive for Firm A to set a lower price for 
this product. Via strategic substitutability of prices, this determines a decrease of all prices. The impact of 
ε  on the prices is the same as in CC. In the Appendix, we show that the condition vv ≥  guarantees that, 
within the relevant parameter set, the market is covered at the equilibrium prices. Finally, it should be 
noted that the price of the standard product is higher than the price of the customizable product, as in CC. 
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initially( decreases(with( the( cost( of( customizability,( but( after( a( threshold( they(
increase.(By(looking(at(the(equilibrium(value(of(h,(it(can(also(be(checked(that(an(






Proposition02.(In!the!nonHsegmented!case,(when!α ( is! low!(resp.!high),(the!profits!of!
the! firm! offering! customizability! are! higher! (lower)! than! the! profits! of! the! firm! not!
offering!customizability.!!
(




Proposition(2( shows( that(Firm(A,(which(offers(both( the( customizable( and(
the(standard(product,(might(get(lower(profits(than(Firm(B,(which(offers(only(the(
standard( product.( This( happens(when( the( percentage( of( type<2( consumers( is(
low( enough.13( Indeed,( when( offering( the( customizable( product( in( the( non<
segmented(case,(Firm(A(must(set(a(price(which(is(sufficiently(low(in(order(to(sell(
this( product( to( both( type<1( and( type<2( consumers.( However,( if( type<2(
consumers(are(few,(the(profits(of(Firm(A(are(lower(than(the(profits(of(the(rival,(
which(can(set(a(high(price(on( type<1( consumers( for( its( standard(product.(The(
opposite( is( true(if( there(are(many(type<2(consumers(which(can(be(served(only(
through(the(customizable(product(of(Firm(A.14(
                                                










14 It can be shown that a higher c reduces the parameter space where the profits of Firm A are larger than 




Let( us( consider( now( the( segmented( case,( where( in( equilibrium( type<1(
consumers(buy(only(the(standard(product,(whereas(all( type<2(consumers(only(












and( *BNNπ .15(On( the(other(hand,( the( equilibrium(price(of(Firm(A( at( the( type<2(
consumers( segment( is( such( that( the( most( distant( consumer( is( left( with( zero(
surplus( when( he( buys( the( customizable( product( of( Firm( A,( that( is(
                                                                                                                                          
and ε  measures the efficiency of customization. Therefore, a higher c and a lower ε  reduces the profits 
of the firm offering customizability with respect to the rival. 
15 The necessary conditions for these prices to sustain the segmented market structure are discussed later 
in Lemma 1. 
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CN ππ = (((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((12)(
(
It( is( immediate( to( observe( that( the( profits( of( Firm(A( are( larger( than( the(
profits(of(Firm(B:(
(
Proposition03.( In! the! segmented!case,( the!profits!of! the! firm!offering!customizability!
are!higher!than!the!profits!of!the!firm!not!offering!customizability.!!
(








Finally,( Lemma( 1( focuses( on( the( parameters’( conditions( sustaining( each(
case:(
(
Lemma0 1:( The! nonHsegmented! case! emerges! if! α ! is! sufficiently! high! and! v" is!
intermediate.!The!segmented!case!emerges!if!v!is!sufficiently!high.!!!
                                                
16 Condition vv ≥  guarantees that Firm A wants to serve all type-2 consumers. Indeed, when Firm A 
serves only a fraction of type-2 consumers (so that )(ˆ ε−−−> tcvpA ), its profits on this segment are 






Aˆˆ . By 
comparing *ˆ)1( ,sAcnpα−  with  xp
A ˆˆ)1( α− , it can be seen that the necessary condition for Firm A 






Intuitively,(when(v( is( large( there( is( a( strong( incentive( to(deviate( from( the(
non<segmented( case( to( the( segmented( case.(Vice<versa,(when(v( is( quite( low,17(










N).( Then,( we( shall( consider( the( case( where( they( commit( sequentially( to( a(
customizability(policy.(In(both(cases,(after(the(customizability(policy(choice,(the(
firms( choose( simultaneously( and( non<cooperatively( the( price(s)( of( the(
product(s)(conditioned(on(the(choice(in(the(first(stage.(
                                                
17 However, v cannot be too low, otherwise the condition vv ≥  is not respected. 
18 In principle, one should consider both the non-segmented and the segmented case also in CC. In what 
follows, we show that this distinction is redundant in CC, as only the non-segmented case emerges. With 
regard to the non-segmented case, we already have shown that, at the equilibrium prices, the market 
structure 01 ≥≥≥≥ AB xkx  is sustained. In CC, this implies that there is no profitable deviation to 
induce the segmented case when the rival is non-segmenting the market. Therefore, the non-segmented 
case is an equilibrium in CC. Next, we show that the segmented case is never an equilibrium in CC. If the 
two firms are segmenting the market, the price of the customizable good (which is purchased only by 
type-2 consumers) is ε−t , whereas the price of the standard good (which is purchased only by type-1 
consumers) is t . The segmented case is sustained only if, given these prices, all type-1 consumers buy the 
standard good. Consider a consumer located at 1/2. His utility is 23tv−  if he buys the standard good, 
whereas it is ctv −−− 2)(3 ε  if he buys the customizable good. It is immediate to see that the consumer 






































cttcttt .( We( can( state( the(
following(proposition:((
0
Proposition0 4.( Suppose! that! the! firms! choose! simultaneously! the! customizability!
policy.!Suppose! nsi = :! if! αα ˆ )(≥≤ ,!the!equilibria!are(CN!and!NC!(the!equilibrium!is!







that( firm( (non<segmented( case).( Recall( that( this( requires( v( to( be( intermediate(




focusing( on( type<1( consumers.( Now( suppose( that( the( rival( is( not( offering(
customizability.( In( this( case,( the( best<reply( of( the( focal( firm( depends( on( the(
percentage(of(type<2(consumers.(In(particular,(if(there(are(few(type<2(consumers(
(i.e.( αα ˆ ≥ ),( offering( customizability( is( quite( costly( (see( the( discussion( about(
Proposition( 2),( as( it( requires( setting( a( low( price( for( the( customizable( good.(
Therefore,(not(offering(customizability(is(the(dominant(strategy(and(NN( is(the(
unique(equilibrium.(At(the(opposite,(if(there(are(enough(type<2(consumers((i.e.(





This(case(requires( that(v( is(high(enough.(From(Proposition(3( it( follows(that,( if(
the( rival( is( not( offering( customizability,( then( the( focal( firm( should( offer(
customizability.( Suppose( now( that( the( rival( is( offering( customizability.(As( in(
the(segmented(case( **, ANN
sA
NC ππ = ,(choosing(customizability(when(the(rival(offers(
customizability(is(profitable(when(profits( in(CC(are(higher(than(profits( in(NN.(
From(Section(3,(we(know(that(this(requires(that(α ( is(sufficiently(low((namely,(
αα ~ ≤ ).( Therefore,( if( there( are( many( type<2( consumers( (i.e.( αα ~≤ ),(
customizability( is( the(dominant( strategy( for(both( firms,( and(CC! is( the(unique(
equilibrium.(It(is(interesting(to(note(that(the(condition(that(guarantees(that(CC(is(
the( unique( equilibrium( (that( is,( αα ~ ≤ )( is( the( same( condition( that( guarantees(
that(the(profits(of(the(firms(when(both(of(them(offer(a(customizable(product(are(
larger( than( the( profits(when( there( is( no( customizability( (Proposition( 1).( This(
implies( that( CC( emerges( in( equilibrium( when( there( is( no( another( situation(
where( both( firms( are( better( off:( that( is,( firms( are( not( trapped( in( a( prisoner(
dilemma.(On(the(other(hand,(if(there(are(few(type<2(consumers((i.e.( αα ~≥ ),(then(
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the( focal( firm( prefers( not( offering( customizability( when( the( rival( offers(
customizability.(In(this(case,(there(are(two(asymmetric(equilibria.((
REMARK:( In! all! equilibria,! a! firm! introducing! the! selfHcustomizable! product!
improves!its!profits!by!so!doing.(
(We( also( consider( the( impact( of( c( and( ε ( on( the( relevant( thresholds( of( α .(
With(regard(to(the(segmented(case,(we(showed(in(Section(3(that(α~ (increases(in(
c( and(decreases( in( ε :( therefore,(higher( c( and( lower( ε ( expand( the(area(where(
both(firms(choose(customizability((CC).(On(the(other(hand,(with(regard(to(the(
non<segmented(case,(we(have(that( αˆ decreases(in( ε ,(whereas(it(is(U<shape(in(c.(
Indeed,(we(know(that,(when(the(rival(does(not(offer(customizability,(the(profits(
of(the(firm(that(offers(customizability(decrease(with(ε (and(are(U<shape(in(c!(see(
Section(4).(Therefore,(when( ε (goes(up,( the(area(where(CN( and(NC( emerge( in(
equilibrium( shrinks;( when( c( increases,( this( area( initially( shrinks,( but( then( it(
expands.(
It( could( be( noted( that,( both( in( the( segmented( and( in( the( non<segmented(
case,( in( the( asymmetric( equilibrium( the( firm( offering( customizability( gets(
greater( profits( than( the( rival.19( Finally,( Proposition( 4( shows( that( any(
customizability(policy(is(possible,(depending(on(the(parameter(constellation.((
(





                                                
19 Indeed, this is obvious for the segmented case (see Proposition 3). For the non-segmented case, it can 
be shown that when an asymmetric equilibrium exists (that is, when αα ≥ˆ , where α  is the necessary 
lower bound of α  for the non-segmented case to occur, see Lemma 1 and the Appendix), then αα ˆ≥°  
holds, which guarantees that the profits of the firm offering customizability are higher than the profits of 




Proposition05.(Suppose! that! the! firms!choose!sequentially! the!customizability!policy.!
Suppose! nsi = :! if! αα ˆ )(≥≤ ,! the! leader! chooses! C! and! the! follower! chooses! N! (both!











In( this( paper,( we( consider( the( implications( of( consumer<based(
customization((or(self<customization)(when(two(firms(compete(through(prices.(
Consumer<based( customization( differs( from( producer<based( customization(
because(the(former(implies(that(the(customization(of(the(product(is(performed(
by( the( end<user( rather( than( by( the( producer.( Consumers( are( increasingly(
attracted( by( the( possibility( to( self<customize( the( product( before( purchase(
(Valenzuela( et( al.,( 2009),( and( firms( might( pursue( the( strategy( of( offering( to(
                                                
20 This kind of first-mover advantage can be found also in the case of producer-based customization 
(Dewan et al., 2003). 
21 Differently from Gu and Tayi (2015), we do not consider explicitly the case where only the 
customizable product is sold by one or both firms. Indeed, it is easy to show that, in the present 
framework, this strategy is always dominated by the strategy of offering both the standard and the 
customizable product. Indeed, suppose that Firm A offers only the customizable product. Consider a 
consumer which is close to point 0. His disutility is equal to cpA +ˆ , plus negligible transportations costs. 
Therefore, Firm A can get higher profits by offering a standard good at a price )ˆ,ˆ( cppp AAA +∈  in 





product( for( a( monopolist,( it( is( still( silent( about( the( implications( of( self<




only( the( customizable(product.( In( such(a( context,( two( firms( compete( through(
prices.(
Our(main(results(are(as(follows.(Self<customization(turns(out(to(be(profitable(
for( firms( when( the( segment( of( “picky”( is( large( enough,( when( the( cost( of(
customization(for(the(consumers(is(not(too(low,(and(the(ability(of(consumers(to(
self<customize(is(not(too(high.(When(it(is(an(equilibrium(strategy,(introducing(a(
self<customizable(product( is(profit( increasing;( in( other(words,( no( firm( regrets(
introducing(a(self<customizable(product(in(equilibrium.((Furthermore,(we(show(
that(when(the(firms(can(commit(to(the(customizability(policy(before(setting(the(
prices,( if( the( segment( of( “picky”( buyers( is( small,( no( firm( introduces( the(
customizable( product.( As( the( value( of( customizability( increases,( a( firm(
introduces( a( customizable( product( and( the( other( does( not( (asymmetric(
equilibrium).( Finally,( when( the( value( of( customizability( is( high( enough,( the(
unique( equilibrium( consists( in( both( firms( introducing( customizability.( Our(
results( could( help( explaining( the( observed( variability( in( customizability(
strategies(across(industries.(
Our( findings( also( have( practical( implications( for( marketers.( First,( the(





versa.( Second,( greater( efficiency( in( customization( by( consumers(might( lower(
the( profits,( as( long( as( it( reduces( product( differentiation.( This( highlights( the(
risks(connected(to(those(practices(aiming(to( improve(the(consumers’(ability( to(
self<customize( the( product,( as( for( example( by( offering( free( training( classes.(
Lastly,( our( model( emphasizes( the( relevance( of( being( the( first( when( offering(
customizability((first<mover(advantage).((
Our(model(could(be(extended(for(future(research.(For(example,(consumers(
are( often( characterized( by( unstable( preferences,( that( is,( by( preferences( that(
might(change(across(periods((Hoeffler(and(Ariely,(1999).(Re<shaping(the(present(
one<period(model(in(a(two<period(model(where(the(preferences(of(consumers(in(
the( second( period( are( related( but( not( identical( to( the( preferences( in( the( first(
period( might( allow( to( consider( the( implications( of( self<customization( in( a(
context( of( varying( preferences.( Second,( the( current( paper( considers( only(
consumer<based( customization.( However,( self<customization( is( often( used(
together( with( producer<based( customization( (Arora( et( al.,( 2008).( The( present(
model( could( be( extended( to( allow( the( firms( to( choose( between( self<
customization((thus(letting(the(consumers(to(bear(the(customization(costs)(and(
producer<based( customization( (thus( sustaining( the( customization( costs),( or( a(
combination( of( them( (co<design).( Lastly,( consumers( are( frequently(
heterogeneous( with( regard( to( their( customization( capability,( depending( on(
their(experience,(innate(skills,(and(knowledge(of(their(own(preferences((Gu(and(
Tayi,(2015).(The(present(model(could(take(account(of( this(additional(source(of(
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Proof0 of0 Lemma0 1.( The( equilibrium( prices( calculated( for( the( case( snsi ,= (
sustain(the(market(structure(i(when(two(conditions(are(simultaneously(satisfied:(
1)( given( *,iACNp , *ˆ
,iA
CNp ( and( *
,iB
CNp ( the( market( structure( assumed( for( case( i( is(
confirmed;(2)(given( *,iBCNp ,(Firm(A(has(no(incentive(to(deviate(in(order(to(induce(
the( other( case.( Let( us( consider( first( the( non<segmented( case.( Condition( 1(











the( segmented( case.( Note( that( the( profits( in( the( non<segmented( case( do( not(
depend(on(v,(whereas(the(profits(under(the(deviation(inducing(the(segmented(
case( are( positively( affected( by( v( (as( the( deviation( price( is( )( ε−−− tcv ).(
Therefore,( condition( 2( for( the( non<segmented( case( is( satisfied( if( v( is( not( too(
high.22(Furthermore,(at(the(equilibrium(prices,(the(utility(of(the(type<2(consumer(
located( at( 1( when( αα = ( is( zero( if( vv = .( Therefore,( the( condition( vv ≥ (
guarantees(that(the(market(is(covered(at(the(equilibrium(prices.(Let(us(consider(
now(the(segmented(case.(Condition(1(requires(that(the(type<1(consumer(located(
at(g(prefers(buying( the(standard(good(of(Firm(A( rather( than(the(customizable(
good.(This(occurs(if(the(price(of(the(customizable(good(is(high(enough,(that(is(if(
v(is(high(enough.(Condition(2(requires(that(Firm(A(has(no(incentive(to(deviate(io(
order( to( induce( the( non<segmented( case.( Following( the( same( reasoning( as(
above,( the(profits( in( the( segmented( case(are(positively(affected(by(v,(whereas(
the(profits(under(the(deviation(inducing(the(non<segmented(case(do(not(depend(
                                                
22 At the same time, v cannot be too low, otherwise the condition vv ≥  is not satisfied. We present a 
numerical example showing that such parameter set is non-empty. Suppose: 1=t , 54=ε , and 201=c , 
yielding 32.2=v , and 109=α . Condition 1 is satisfied, as 37.0=α . Condition 2 requires 49.2<v . 
Therefore, when )49.2 ,32.2(∈v , the non-segmented case emerges in equilibrium.( 
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on(v.(Hence,( condition(2( for( the( segmented(case( is( satisfied( if(v( is( sufficiently(
high.23(
Proof0 of0 Proposition0 5.( Suppose( Firm(A(B)( is( the( leader( (follower).!Consider(
nsi = .(If(the(leader(has(chosen(C,(the(follower(always(chooses(N((see(Table(1).(If(
the( leader( has( chosen( N,( the( follower( chooses( C! (N)( when( αα ˆ )(≥≤ .( As(
** ,, nsANN
nsA
CN ππ ≤ (when( αα ˆ≥ ,(both(firms(choose(N(when( αα ˆ≥ .(On(the(other(hand,(
as( ** ,, nsANC
nsA
CN ππ ≥ (when( αα ˆ≤ ( (Footnote( 21),( the( leader( chooses(C(whereas( the(
follower(chooses(N!when( αα ˆ≤ .(Consider( si = .(If(the(leader(has(chosen(N,(the(
follower(always(chooses(C((see(Table(1).(If(the(leader(has(chosen(C,(the(follower(
chooses(C!(N)(when( αα ~ )(≥≤ .(As( ** ,, sANCsACC ππ ≥ ,(both(firms(choose(C(when( αα ~≤ .(
On(the(other(hand,(as( ** ,, sANC
sA
CN ππ ≥ ,( the( leader(chooses(C(whereas( the(follower(
chooses(N!when( αα ~≥ .(
(
((
                                                
23 When both α  and v are low there is no equilibrium. Numerical computations show that multiple 
equilibria do not arise. Details are available. 
